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that Humanity is Humanity. They have said that Humanity is the Supreme Being. In saying this they have implied that Humanity is God.

STANTON COIT.

LONDON.

MR. MOORE ON HEDONISM.

I must begin by expressing agreement with much of what Mr. Moore says in his "*Principia Ethica*"—a good deal of which is, indeed, as he himself observes, to be found in substance in the "*Methods of Ethics*," though Mr. Moore prefers to give his own statements, which must be allowed to be generally clear and incisive and remarkably free from irrelevancies.

Among the points to which I refer are some very important questions of method. Mr. Moore holds that what is intrinsically good, desirable in itself or as an end, should be distinguished from what is right or good as means; that the question what is good in itself can only be decided by intuition, while questions of what it is right *to do*, involve actual relations of cause and effect, and require empirical treatment, an investigation into the *results* of actions (cp. "*Methods of Ethics*," 6th Ed., p. 195 etc.) He holds further that the notion "good" is indefinable—indefinable that is, in the Conceptualist sense, in which *Definition* means analysis of a notion and is only applicable where there is complexity (cp. "*Principia Ethica*" p. 7). If and in as far as this notion is identifiable with *ought*, it would seem that it is simple and ultimate and that Mr. Moore is right here. We can, of course, as he would allow ("*Principia Ethica*," pp. 5, 67, etc.), try to convey our meaning by saying that Good is desirable,—it is what ought to exist, what we ought to desire, and ought to seek to produce—Right actions are what ought to be done, etc.,¹ but this is only to express the same simple notion from

¹ As I understand Mr. Moore, he inclines to agree on the whole with Common Sense views of right conduct.

different aspects and in different phrase. In Mr. Moore's view, we can *not* say that Good *means* some "natural" object—something of which the existence is admittedly an object of experience—*e.g.*, What is Necessary,² What is Normal, What is Pleasant; or some other object which is inferred to exist in a supersensible world—*e.g.*, What is the true Reality,—so that the question, "What is Good?" logically depends upon the answer to the question, "What is the nature of supersensible existence." ("Principia Ethica," pp. 38, 39, viii, ix.)

Although Mr. Moore holds that Good is indefinable, he says that we *can* define what he calls The Good, *i.e.*, the things that are good—which things we can only know to be good by intuition (cp. "Principia Ethica," pp. viii, ix). What Mr. Moore means by Definition *here*, however, appears to be what has been called "extensive definition"—what Dr. Bosanquet calls "enumeration." Thus to say that *Metals* are: Gold, Silver, Iron, Copper, Tin, Platinum, etc., is to give an Extensive Definition of Metal, *i. e.*, an Enumeration of Metals.³ Still if what are intuitively known to be such that Good is predicable of them, are types or classes of things (and this seems to be Mr. Moore's view), we *can* also give at least the connotation of *each* such type or class. We intuitively recognize such and such things to be good—the things, say, that have qualities ABC or DEF; of what we call ABC then or, DEF,—of objects *recognizable by the possession of those attributes*—Good is predicable, though Good does not *mean* ABC or DEF, any more than yellow *means* Gold or Orange or Topaz or Sulphur. "We are all aware," says Mr. Moore, "of a certain simple quality which . . . and not any thing else is what we mainly mean by the term 'good'; and . . . not one but many different things possess this quality . . . things which are good *do not owe their goodness to*⁴ their common possession of any other property [or properties]." And not only so, but apparently in Mr. Moore's view, they do not even *possess* any selection of distinctive common properties which might be set out in a (connotative) definition common

² Is this, however, an object of experience?

³ Cf. "Principia Ethica," p. 3, § 4, etc.

⁴ Italics mine.

to the whole group of *good things*. They are intuited to be *good* as turquoises, violets, the sea, the sky, are intuited to be *blue*—but we have *not* in the case of good (as we *have* *e. g.* in the case of Truth) any criterion or test.

Thus we cannot on Mr. Moore's view, give an ordinary connotative definition of "the things which are good," but only at most a sort of alternative definition—we may, that is (if we accept his selection of the greatest goods), define (1) Personal Affection and (2) Contemplation of Beauty—but we can give no distinctive definition which covers both (1) and (2). I agree with Dr. Bosanquet that Mr. Moore's position here, seems rather unsatisfactory, though I think that Goodness is indefinable—as much indefinable as Existence (to which it is opposed as Ideal to Real)—neither notion can be analysed into simpler elements, neither can be "defined" *per genus et differentiam*. This does not of course mean that *nothing can be said* about Goodness or Existence, as Dr. Bosanquet, through an unusual extension of the meaning of Definition seems to suggest. In Dr. Bosanquet's view of Definition the statements *e. g.*, that "Yellow is the basis of good color," or that "Yellow is a more cheerful color than blue," are parts of the *Definition* of Yellow.

Mr. Moore appears to hold that uniqueness is a cause of indefinableness, and says (p. 13) "though pleasure is absolutely indefinable, though pleasure is pleasure and nothing else whatever, etc.,"—and again, (p. 140), "unless yellow did in the end mean just 'yellow' and nothing else whatever—unless it was absolutely indefinable." But it is not uniqueness which is the cause of indefinableness, either in the Conceptualist sense of Definition (as analysis of a notion), or in the ordinary Nominalist sense, in which Definition means setting out the meaning or connotation of a word. Every notion (as Dr. Bosanquet has recently pointed out), is unique whether simple or not. It is also to be noted that if we could take *any* concept or meaning purely and strictly in connotation, we could not even define it. We could affirm absolutely nothing whatever but *A is A*—we could say nothing significant, we could make no synthetic or even explanatory assertion—we could not even state the

equivalence of different terms or phrases, we could not even affirm that *A means X*. Yellow connotatively *is* Yellow and nothing else whatever, just as Orange (though complex and definable) *is* Orange and nothing else whatever; and similarly Good *is* Good and nothing else whatever. But as Yellow or Orange, or Goodness, or anything else, can only be spoken of or thought of, can only be subject or predicate of a judgment, if regarded in relation to some other thing or quality *i. e.*, if the denotational or extensional aspect is taken account of—it follows that whenever we do think or talk of anything with intelligence, whenever we frame judgments about it of the form *A is B*, then we do necessarily take account of it extensionally (as well as intensionally). A mere abstract idea, a meaning or connotation regarded purely connotationally, purely as a concept, is like one of Leibniz's monads, having "no windows" by which anything could get into or out of it, a closed, solitary, impenetrable whole, incapable of entering into relations with anything else. And it is clear that we cannot say all this about it, unless we are considering it in denotation and in relation to other things. As Locke long ago declared: "All our affirmations are only in concrete," and no general name taken *merely intensively*, merely qualitatively, is more than abstract (in Locke's sense of abstract). Both in nature and in thought nothing can be used or useful which has not its place in relation to other things, as well as an intrinsic nature, and an abstract "meaning" to its name. I think, then, that what is both the source and in some sense a justification of the distinction which Mr. Moore tries to draw between Good and The Good (=Good things) is, that of the *notion* Good taken purely in abstraction we can only say *A is A*, while if we take the denotation also into account—that is, if we take *concrete* Good, we may intelligibly, whether or not correctly, say of it that it *is*—not that it *means*—*Æsthetic* Enjoyment, or Personal Affection, or Pleasant Feeling, that it is known intuitively, etc.

To the criticisms on Naturalistic Ethics (other than Hedonism) in Ch. II. I have no intention of objecting—indeed I do not know what competent thinker would at the present time attempt to defend the ethical system of Herbert Spencer, or the

view that what is Normal (usual) or Necessary is, as such, Good. Again, I have no desire to attempt the re-vindication of "Metaphysical" Ethics (Ch. IV) against Mr. Moore's attacks—this defence is, moreover, already in the ablest hands. I turn to Ch. III in which Mr. Moore makes a very elaborate and determined onslaught on "Hedonism." He seems to take this even more seriously than the discussion of Metaphysical Ethics, or the other forms of Naturalistic Ethics—and no doubt the question in dispute here is very critical. It is specially difficult to deal with, and the views which Mr. Moore attempts to controvert are the final conclusions of the thinker to whom his own doctrine and method owe so much.

Having accepted as the definition of Ethical Hedonism that it is the doctrine which takes Pleasure (or Happiness) as the sole good, he first enters on a discussion and criticism of J. S. Mill's views. Much of this criticism is already familiar to students of the "Methods of Ethics" to which Mr. Moore here acknowledges his obligations (p.64). We already know, for instance that Mill's "Proof" of Utilitarianism will not stand examination, that Psychological Hedonism is not a true doctrine, and that it is something quite different from Ethical Hedonism. Mr. Moore, however, adds some items, including the following original disproof of Psychological Hedonism, which does not seem to me convincing.

"Let us try to analyze the psychological state which is called "desire." That name is usually confined to a state of mind in which the idea of some object or event, not yet existing is present to us. Suppose, for instance, I am desiring a glass of port wine. I have the idea of drinking such a glass before my mind, although I am not yet drinking it. Well, how does pleasure enter into this relation? My theory is that it enters in, in this way. The idea of the drinking causes a feeling of pleasure in my mind, which helps to produce that state of incipient activity, which is called "desire." It is, therefore, because of a pleasure, which I already have—the pleasure excited by a mere idea—that I desire the wine, which I have not. And I am ready to admit that a pleasure of this kind, an actual pleasure, is always among the causes of every desire, and not only of every desire,

but of every mental activity, whether conscious or sub-conscious. I am ready to *admit* this, I say: I cannot vouch that it is the true psychological doctrine; but, at all events, it is not *prima facie* quite absurd. And now, what is the other doctrine, the doctrine which I am supposing held, and which is at all events essential to Mill's argument? It is this: That when I desire the wine, it is not the wine which I desire but the pleasure which I expect to get from it. In other words, the doctrine is that the idea of a pleasure *not actual* is always necessary to cause desire; whereas my doctrine was that the *actual* pleasure caused by the idea of something else was always necessary to cause desire [of something *other* than pleasure]. It is these two different theories which I suppose the Psychological Hedonist to confuse: the confusion is, as Mr. Bradley puts it,⁶ between "a pleasant thought" and "the thought of a pleasure." It is in fact only where the latter, the "thought of a pleasure," is present, that pleasure can be said to be the *object* of desire, or the *motive* to action. On the other hand, when only a pleasant thought is present, as, I admit, *may* always be the case, then it is the object of the thought—that which we are thinking about—which is the object of desire and the motive to action; and the pleasure, which that thought excites, may, indeed, cause our desire or move us to action, but it is *not* our end or object nor our motive." ("Principia Ethica," pp. 69, 70.)

Mr. Moore thinks that the (mistaken) doctrine of Psychological Hedonism—the doctrine that nothing but Pleasure is *desired*—is largely due to confusion between the *cause* and *object* of desire, and that thus his analysis (given above) of the nature and causes of desire furnishes an explanation of the prevalence of the psychological-hedonist's theory. It seems to me, however, in view of the somewhat doubtful nature of this analysis of desire, more plausible to hold that—pleasure (pleasant consciousness and freedom from pain) having a very important place among the objects of *actual desire*, and being at the same time recognized as desirable (=what *ought* to be desired, or is *reasonably* desired)—by a confusion between the

⁶ "Ethical Studies," p. 232.

ethical and psychological points of view, the psychological fact is confirmed, exaggerated, and finally universalized.⁷

Having devoted six sections (39-44) of this Chapter to criticism of Mill's Utilitarianism, Mr. Moore proceeds in §§ 45 ff. to consider Hedonism in the form in which (as he holds) it is set forth in the "Methods of Ethics." As already noted, he agrees:—(1) in regarding the Principle of Hedonism—that Happiness (=Pleasure and the Absence of Pain) is the sole end of action—as being an object of Intuition and incapable of proof; (2) in holding that there is no difference of *quality* in pleasure (or Happiness); and proceeds at once to consider the vital question: Is Pleasure (or Happiness) the sole Good?

Mr. Moore allows that proof or disproof in the strict sense is impossible, but as there is here a conflict of intuitions, he attempts to "present considerations capable of determining the intellect" to *reject* the "intuitive" principle in question, and he then sets out on this further stage of investigation in the hope that he will in the course of it "remove some more of such prejudices and misunderstandings as might prevent agreement" with him (p. 81).

The discussion here has four stages, being concerned with (1) the question whether all good (for man) is part of conscious Human Existence; (2) whether Pleasure as distinct from the consciousness of it is intrinsically valuable and the sole thing that is thus valuable; (3) whether consciousness of Pleasure (conscious Happiness) is the sole good; (4) a consideration of the Egoistic and Utilitarian varieties of Hedonism.

(1) Mr. Moore combats the view that what is intrinsically good must be a good of *consciousness*,⁸ and in order to "determine the intellect" of his readers to agree with him, puts a supposititious case⁹ of two "worlds," one the most beautiful (to the eye) and the other the most ugly, that could be imag-

⁷ Compare with Mr. Moore's remarks about Mill's confusion in reference to money as end, the note on p. 93 of *Methods of Ethics*.

⁸ Compare here § 113 of "Principia Ethica."

⁹ Compare here § 4 of Ch. IX of Bk. I, and §§ 3-5 of Ch. XIV of Book III of "Methods of Ethics."

ined, the circumstances being such that neither can ever be an object of consciousness to any conscious mind. By supposition, no conscious creature sees, knows or imagines anything whatever about these worlds—to every living, thinking, seeing, feeling being they are as though they were not—they neither help nor hinder, please nor displease—no one ever came across them in experience or fancy; and yet the supposed beautiful world, we are told, is to be esteemed by us as intrinsically *good*, its “existence” would be a “part of our end.” In this case either our end may be partly *not* an end of which we are conscious, *or* the worlds are objects of imaginary contemplation to us. The latter possibility, however, seems contrary to the supposed conditions of the case, and particularly inadmissible in view of Mr. Moore’s own estimate of the value of imaginary objects (see the last paragraph of his book: “These goods are undoubtedly good even when the things or persons loved are imaginary etc.”—p. 224, §135).

We ought (to put Mr. Moore’s case) to imagine these worlds as having no effect on conscious minds, as being entirely apart from feeling or cognition—in this case by what method do we reach the judgment that the one is better than the other? Granting that there is no difficulty about what Beauty is, or by what standard it is to be judged, we must still ask: Is visible Beauty apart from any perception of it (real or imagined) any more valuable than *e.g.*, sound that is unheard?—Mr. Moore adds, that it would be “well” for *us* “to do what we could to produce” the beautiful world rather than the ugly one. This looks like an inadvertence. It is no doubt one very natural to fall into in the circumstances—still it is unfortunate for Mr. Moore’s contention. I am unable to see any reason for agreeing with Mr. Moore here, but this is perhaps of the less consequence, as he affirms on the next page (p. 85) that the matter seems to him not very important—a mistake here being, he says “utterly insignificant” in comparison with the mistake of considering pleasure or consciousness of pleasure as the sole good. Moreover it appears in § 113, p. 188, that in Mr. Moore’s view “the most valuable things which we know or can imagine are certain states of con-

sciousness" (correspondingly, the great evils are evils of consciousness).¹⁰

(2) We pass to the question whether *Pleasure as distinct from consciousness of pleasure* is the sole thing intrinsically good. Mr. Moore deals with this in §52 and supports his view by quoting from the "Philebus" a page of dialogue in which Protarchus having been led by Socrates into the avowal that he would gladly spend his whole life "in the enjoyment of the greatest pleasures," is inveigled step by step into further admissions which end by committing him to acceptance of the life of an oyster or some other creature whose soul is "concealed in a shelly body," such denizens of the seas having (according to Socrates) no knowledge or intelligence, no memory, no sight. "Well, then, can we think such a life desirable?" Socrates finally asks. To this Protarchus has no answer but: "Socrates your reasoning has left me utterly dumb."¹¹

Protarchus might perhaps have made a stand before this final stage of disintegration was reached, but at least, at the bitter end, he might have turned upon Socrates with the counter-question: "*Would* such a life as you have described, destitute of the causes and avenues of human pleasure, be full of enjoyment of the greatest pleasures, and, in particular, does a life of enjoyment of the greatest pleasures *mean* a life in which there is no *knowledge* (that is, no consciousness, no awareness or experience) of Pleasure? Does not Pleasure *mean* Pleasant-consciousness? *You ask me*: Would such a life be desirable? but *I ask you*: Would such a life be pleasant? *If* any life were '*full of enjoyment of the greatest pleasures*' it would no

¹⁰ That the good must be a Good of Conscious life (=existence)—*i. e.*, of the life of some living conscious being—means that it must be a good to that conscious being of whose conscious life it is a part—however a "good of consciousness" may be interpreted, a spectator can judge it to be a "good" of consciousness only on this account.

¹¹ It may be observed that from Mr. Moore's point of view, Socrates' argument seems to have no standing *here*—for pleasure of which there is no consciousness, awareness, or experience, is certainly not a good of consciousness, nor a part of human existence. And here (in §§ 51, 52), Mr. Moore has (as I understand) passed to consider goods which are goods of consciousness, part of human existence (cf. "Methods of Ethics" I, iii, § 4).

doubt be, so far, desirable, intrinsically good; but what is *fullness of enjoyment*, what is *greatest pleasures*, of which there is no consciousness? Is not *enjoyment*, or *pleasure*, *without consciousness*, a ridiculous abstraction, a contradiction in terms? Socrates, "your psychological analysis is faulty."

If indeed by *knowledge of being pleased* Socrates meant *self-conscious* recognition by, *e. g.*, Protarchus, that *he* was pleased and not mere unself-conscious awareness of pleasure, or feeling of pleasure—then I think it would have to be allowed that a life of great happiness is possible without this "knowledge,"—just as a thinker may have great stores of learning without saying to himself: "*I know all this.*" But (1) Mr. Moore does not take or use the argument in this sense. (2) It is not an argument against Hedonism as held by Hedonists. (3) It is not clear that the psychological analysis of Plato had gone so far as to distinguish unambiguously between these two senses of *knowledge of pleasure*—indeed it seems probable that we owe this argument with Protarchus to the absence of such distinction in Plato's mind.

I go on to ask: Is it possible that Socrates, in his discourse with Protarchus, means by Pleasure the abstract idea of Pleasurableness (in Locke's sense of Abstract Idea)? If he does, his polemic is as obviously unnecessary as it would be if he meant by *knowledge of Pleasure self-conscious knowledge*. It is unnecessary to prove that an abstract idea of anything whatever—of Pleasure-without-consciousness (if such an idea is possible) or Pleasure-with-consciousness—is not *The Good*. An abstraction—the idea of *e. g.*, "Pleasure" (however understood) withdrawn from denotation or extension—cannot even be an object of rational desire, *a fortiori* it cannot be the sole good. In this case, then, the polemic of Socrates is superfluous; and it is only by taking "Pleasure" in a different sense—in the *concrete* general sense of Pleasant states or Pleasant experience (as ordinary thought takes it or as Mr. Moore, *e. g.*, does in his discussion of Psychological Hedonism) that the argument is either plausible or applicable. In this latter case, however—if, that is, we take the concrete general sense of Pleasure (in Mill's meaning of "concrete")—the argument of

Socrates breaks down. For Pleasure in the concrete, as an element of life, as a possible human end, as enjoyment, can at any rate not be separated from all consciousness (=awareness) of Pleasure. However, Mr. Moore's conclusion here (p. 89) is that Socrates has shown "Hedonism" to be absurd (as in the "Protagoras," with even more convincing argument, he showed it to be the one true doctrine). But when has it been held, either by professed Hedonists or by Common Sense, that *Pleasure-without-consciousness* (that is, without awareness of Pleasure) is good? What indeed is Pleasure-without-consciousness (without awareness)? What does it mean? And it certainly cannot for a moment be maintained that Professor Sidgwick holds Pleasure-without-consciousness to be The Good. For him, *Pleasure* is *pleasant feeling*, *Happiness* is *pleasant feeling and the absence of unpleasant feeling (or pain)*—Happiness is that element of conscious life which (in his view) makes conscious life desirable. (He describes the Utilitarian as aiming at "the greatest possible happiness under certain definitely conceived conditions," cp. "Lectures on Green's Ethics," p. III.) And even granting that the *pleasantness* in any state of consciousness could be distinguished from the consciousness, and that it is this *pleasantness-distinguished-from-consciousness*, which makes the state in itself desirable, it seems clear that it cannot even be conceived or imagined in actual separation from it, that the idea of pleasure that is not conscious pleasure, pleasant feeling that is not feeling, is self-destructive, as much so as blue that is not blue color, color that is not extended, warmth that is not temperature, a reflection in a mirror which is not a reflection of the object reflected. I think, however, that we can *not* even distinguish the pleasure from the consciousness in any pleasant conscious state, but only the pleasant-consciousness from some other kind of consciousness, just as in a colored visible surface we cannot distinguish the color from the extension which bears it (because it is *extended color*), but only one colored extension from another colored extension. So in a picture or embroidery or tapestry we cannot even abstract the pictorial composition with which the extension is filled from extension. But of course extension

or consciousness can be abstracted from any particular case or variety of extension or consciousness. At any rate it seems to me that Pleasure that is not conscious or experienced pleasure, pleasure of which no one is aware, pleasant feeling that is not felt, is not only plainly valueless, but is further self-contradictory. Socrates in the passage quoted from the "Philebus" is perhaps not trying to *prove* the truth, but only by a dexterous use of his rhetorical yet unrivalled dialectic, to harry his over-matched and confused adversary somehow or other into an admission of that which he is himself at the time, putting forward as true, or at any rate arguable.

Mr. Moore, convinced it would seem by Socrates, appears to think that there can be concrete Pleasure (Pleasant feeling) without consciousness, and speaks of the possibility of "some day" producing "the intensest pleasure without any consciousness that it is there." (See also p. 212, where he speaks of "Pleasure, however intense, which no one felt.")

This is indeed a "precipice of paradox," yet not more so than his account of *Pain* (p. 212), which (as I understand) he explains to be simple *cognition* of an object (*i. e.*, *Pain*,) not in volving any "feeling-attitude." It is not clear whether Mr. Moore's psychology of Pleasure is analogous, nor how far he distinguishes between consciousness=mere awareness or experience [of Pleasure] and consciousness=self-conscious reflection [on Pleasure]. No doubt Pain and Pleasure may be merely objects of cognition—as, *e. g.*, when their value is reflectively estimated by the moralist or psychologist. This, however, is not their character as items of experience, it is not their character as existent, as occurring in conscious life. (Compare here Mr. Moore's explanation of Psychological Hedonism.) Pleasure may no doubt be felt, experienced, without being reflected on and recognized as *my Pleasure*—*having Pleasure* does not mean knowing that *I* have pleasure, any more than *perceiving an object* means knowing that *I* perceive it, or than willing a thing means that *I* reflect that *I* will it. However, as already observed, it seems fairly inferrible that for Mr. Moore in his polemic, consciousness of Pleasure does not mean *reflective self-consciousness consciousness*. I think the self-

conscious consciousness would not really apply throughout his discussion, and it seems as clear that Hedonism does *not* require and has not postulated this, as that it *does* require, and has postulated, the other unreflective un-self-conscious consciousness, or awareness, of pleasure (pleasant consciousness).

Here once more, however, after a struggle in which he has again contested the ground inch by inch, Mr. Moore concedes that the point is of "comparatively slight" importance. "What I wish to maintain," he says, "is that even consciousness of pleasure is not the sole good."

(3) To this point, then, he now addresses himself. "In order to ask the question fairly" he says, "we must isolate *consciousness of pleasure*. We must ask: Suppose we were *conscious of pleasure only* . . . would that stage of things, *however great the quantity*,¹² be very desirable? *No one*, I think, *can* suppose it so."¹³

We must note here that Mr. Moore, after thus stating the question as he considers it must be put in order that the final case for Hedonism may be fairly judged, says that in his opinion *no one can* suppose that an answer in favor of Hedonism can be given. But then either the Hedonist position is not fairly stated, or Mr. Moore is mistaken in thinking that *no one can* accept the position—else what becomes of the existence of Hedonists, and what need of so much controversy in order to refute them?

I incline to think that we must accept the first alternative, and allow that the position as Mr. Moore conceives he has presented it, is *not* fairly stated. And this opinion is strengthened by a comparison of what Mr. Moore goes on to say, namely that "on the other hand it seems quite plain that we do regard as very desirable many complicated states of mind in which the consciousness of pleasure is combined with consciousness of other things—states which we call *enjoyment of so and so*—with what he (inadvertently, I suppose) says and implies in putting (on p. 95) the decisive question about pleasure quoted above.

¹² Consider what is involved in anyone's consciousness of an indefinitely great quantity of pleasure.

¹³ Italics mine.

For if *we* (any *we*) are conscious of pleasure and of a great quantity of pleasure, consciousness of pleasure is itself a "complicated state" in which, as Mr. Moore seems to recognize, there is included not only pleasure and awareness of it, but also the conscious subject who experiences it and must apparently be aware of quantity, of more or less, and moreover a conscious subject of the ordinary human sort, who is supposed to exist under conditions of time, and is possessed at the least of memory and as much intelligence as that implies (unless we imagine any quantity of pleasure to be experienced in an indivisible instant). There is also, I hold, necessarily implied in this complicated state a further complication, namely that some object of cognition,—sensational, perceptual, ideational—must be present to, and attended to by, the conscious subject of pleasant experience before he can experience pleasure—pleasant experience must have a cause. Mr. Moore, inclining as I understand, to hold that Pleasure and Pain are primarily objects of the cognitive consciousness not only of the psychologist but also of the beings whose Pleasure and Pain they are, treats them very strangely. Still he does not I think, indicate that they should not be treated correspondingly, except in one respect, that of their worth. Here, while Pleasure in any quantity or intensity he holds to be of very slight positive value, intense Pain (even when a "mere cognition") he holds to be a very great evil. But intense Pain, and still more long-continued Pain, seems to involve memory and anticipation, and similarly it would seem that intense Pleasure, and, still more, extensive quantity of Pleasure (and all quantity of Pleasure must have extent), must involve them. Mr. Moore sometimes speaks as if Pleasure or Pain could be treated on exactly the same footing in relation to the other "parts" of the state of consciousness to which they belong, as one part of a machine to the rest, thus mixing up the worth in a thing or state, that in it which, on a hedonistic view, is good or bad, with the objects of cognitive consciousness on the presence of which the feeling in the case—the pain or pleasure or indifference—depends. But we do not add the pleasure to the total of a complex object of cognition as we may add a touch to a picture, a color to a surface, a stitch to an embroidery,

any more than we add goodness or badness to it; the object being, otherwise, what it is, its pleasantness, or painfulness (as its goodness or badness, or in a proposition, its truth) is thereby determined. For a Hedonist the Happiness of a state is that in the state which has intrinsic value; it is not an element of value to be added to other disparate elements of value, and so made into a "sum"; it is the *other* elements of the state which are together the cause of this one intrinsically and finally valuable element. For the conscious subject his Pleasure or Pain is conditioned by the nature of the object presented to him. We may abstract from *any feeling-producing object in particular*, but cannot abstract from all—at least we have to recognize that Pleasure or Pain imply an object as much as they imply a subject. Some of the complex wholes, which Mr. Moore regards as desirable, seem to differ from so-called *pleasant states*, only by specifying the character of the objects of cognition involved—by being rather more definite, rather less abstract.

To return, however, to Mr. Moore's discussion of Professor Sidgwick's arguments in favor of Hedonism. He reviews the considerations put forward in the "Methods of Ethics," Bk. III, Ch. xiv, in support of the view that granting what is *intrinsically, in itself*, good or desirable (=what ought to be desired) to be Desirable Consciousness, our choice is between (1) Happiness, (2) certain objective relations of the Conscious Mind, and that it is (1) which ought to be chosen.

"When, [says Professor Sidgwick *op. cit.* p. 398] we reflect on a cognition as a transient fact of an individual's psychical experience,—distinguishing it on the one hand from the feeling that normally accompanies it, and on the other hand from that relation of the knowing mind to the object known which is implied in the term 'true' or 'valid cognition'—it is seen to be an element of consciousness quite neutral in respect of desirability: and the same may be said of Volitions, when we abstract from their concomitant feelings, and their relation to an objective norm or ideal, as well as from all their consequences. It is no doubt true that in ordinary thought certain states of consciousness—such as Cognition of Truth, Contemplation of Beauty, Volition to realize Freedom or Virtue—are sometimes judged to be preferable on other grounds than their pleasantness; but the general explanation of this seems to be (as was suggested in Book II, Chap. ii, § 2), that what in such cases we really prefer is not the present consciousness itself, but either effects on future consciousness more or less distinctly foreseen, or else something in the

objective relations of the conscious being, not strictly included in his present consciousness.

"The second of these alternatives may perhaps be made clearer by some illustrations. A man may prefer the mental state of apprehending truth to the state of half-reliance on generally accredited fictions, while recognizing that the former state may be more painful than the latter, and independently of any effect which he expects either state to have upon his subsequent consciousness. Here, on my view, the real object of preference is not the consciousness of knowing truth, considered merely as consciousness,—the element of pleasure or satisfaction in this being more than outweighed by the concomitant pain,—but the relation between the mind and something else, which as the very notion of 'truth' implies, is whatever it is independently of our cognition of it, and which I therefore call objective. This may become more clear if we imagine ourselves learning afterwards that what we took for truth is not really such: for in this case we should certainly feel that our preference had been mistaken: whereas if our choice had really been between two elements of transient consciousness, its reasonableness could not be affected by any subsequent discovery.

"Similarly, a man may prefer freedom and penury to a life of luxurious servitude, not because the pleasant consciousness of being free outweighs in prospect all the comforts and securities that the other life would afford, but because he has a predominant aversion to that relation between his will and the will of another which we call slavery: or, again, a philosopher may choose what he conceives as 'inner freedom'—the consistent self-determination of the will—rather than the gratifications of appetite; though recognizing that the latter are more desirable, considered merely as transient feelings. In either case, he will be led to regard his preference as mistaken, if he be afterwards persuaded that his conception of Freedom or self-determination was illusory; that we are all slaves of circumstances, destiny, etc.

"So again, the preference of conformity to Virtue, or contemplation of Beauty, to a state of consciousness recognized as more pleasant seems to depend on a belief that one's conception of Virtue or Beauty corresponds to an ideal to some extent objective and valid for all minds. Apart from any consideration of future consequences, we should generally agree that a man who sacrificed happiness to an erroneous conception of Virtue or Beauty made a mistaken choice.

"Still, it may be said that this is merely a question of definition; that we may take 'conscious life' in a wide sense, so as to include the objective relations of the conscious being implied in our notions of Virtue, Truth, Beauty, Freedom; and that from this point of view we may regard cognition of Truth, contemplation of Beauty, Free or Virtuous action, as in some measure preferable alternatives to Pleasure or Happiness,—even though we admit that Happiness must be included as a part of Ultimate Good. In this case the principle of Rational Benevolence, which was stated in the last chapter as an indubitable intuition of the practical Reason, would not direct us to the pursuit of universal happiness alone, but to these "ideal goods" as well, as ends ultimately desirable for mankind generally.

"I think, however, that this view ought not to commend itself to the sober judgment of reflective persons. In order to show this, I must ask the reader to use the same twofold procedure that I before requested him to employ in considering the absolute and independent validity of common moral precepts. I appeal firstly to his intuitive judgment after due consideration of the question when fairly placed before it: and secondly to a comprehensive comparison of the ordinary judgments of mankind. As regards the first argument, to me at least it seems clear after reflection that these objective relations of the conscious subject, when distinguished from the consciousness accompanying and resulting from them, are not ultimately and intrinsically desirable; any more than material or other objects are, when considered apart from any relation to conscious existence. Admitting that we have actual experience of such preferences as have just been described, of which the ultimate object is something that is not merely consciousness: it still seems to me that when (to use Butler's phrase) we 'sit down in a cool hour', we can only justify to ourselves the importance that we attach to any of these objects by considering its conduciveness, in one way or another, to the happiness of sentient beings.

"The second argument, that refers to the common sense of mankind, obviously cannot be made completely cogent; since, as above stated, several cultivated persons do habitually judge that knowledge, art, etc.,—not to speak of *Virtue*—are ends independently of the pleasure derived from them. But we may urge not only that all these elements of "ideal good" are productive of pleasure in various ways; but also that they seem to obtain the commendation of Common Sense, roughly speaking, in proportion to the degree of this productiveness. This seems obviously true of *Beauty*; and will hardly be denied in respect of any kind of social ideal; it is paradoxical to maintain that any degree of *Freedom*, or any form of social order, would still be commonly regarded as desirable even if we were certain that it had no tendency to promote the general happiness. The case of *Knowledge* is rather more complex; but certainly Common Sense is most impressed with the value of knowledge, when its 'fruitfulness' has been demonstrated. It is, however, aware that experience has frequently shown how knowledge, long fruitless, may become unexpectedly fruitful, and how light may be shed on one part of the field of knowledge from another apparently remote: and even if any particular branch of scientific pursuit could be shown to be devoid of even this indirect utility, it would still deserve some respect on utilitarian grounds; both as furnishing to the inquirer the refined and innocent pleasures of curiosity, and because the intellectual disposition which it exhibits and sustains is likely on the whole to produce fruitful knowledge. Still in cases approximating to this last, Common Sense is somewhat disposed to complain of the misdirection of valuable effort; so that the meed of honor commonly paid to Science seems to be graduated, though perhaps unconsciously, by a tolerably exact utilitarian scale. Certainly the moment the legitimacy of any branch of scientific inquiry is seriously disputed, as in the recent case of vivisection, the controversy on both sides is generally conducted on an avowedly utilitarian basis" (p. 402).

Mr. Moore criticises the appeal here to Common Sense, say-

ing that even if "roughly speaking" the commendation of Common Sense is in proportion to the felicific effects of that which it commends, and assuming the judgments of Common Sense to be on the whole correct, this would only show "that pleasure was a good *criterion* of right action—that the same conduct which produced most pleasure would also produce most good on the whole. But this would by no means entitle us to the conclusion that the greatest pleasure *constituted* what was best on the whole." We should, however, I think, be entitled to the conclusion that *in the opinion of Common Sense*, the greatest happiness (or pleasure and absence of pain) does constitute what is best on the whole¹⁴. and of course it is to *Common Sense opinion* that Professor Sidgwick appeals. Professor Sidgwick's detailed illustrations here, says Mr. Moore (p.92), only tend to show that a thing is not held to be good unless it gives a balance of pleasure; but I think they go so far beyond this as to support the allegation that what produces much Happiness receives much commendation from Common Sense—while on the other hand there is doubt that whatever produces much unhappiness or pain or misery does in a general way receive much blame. In fact, if of two actions quite similar in intention and motive one produces much suffering and the other does not, the one that produces the suffering may be severely blamed, the other not at all (and so, *mutatis mutandis*, of felicific results.) Consider for instance the blame meted out to a railway official when some quite ordinary and very slight omission, or carelessness, or want of judgment, unfortunately produces an awful railway accident. At any rate there is no doubt that an abundance of illustrations of the sort required might very easily be brought forward, and "the meed of honor commonly paid to Science" and other elements of ideal good, does "seem to be graduated, though perhaps unconsciously, by a tolerably exact utilitarian scale." The cumulative argument of the "Methods of Ethics" (cf. Book III) for the implicit ap-

¹⁴ On the hedonist view, a state's immediate intrinsic goodness=its happiness or pleasantness, while in estimating the state's value on the whole, its felicific (=pleasure-producing) quality (its goodness as means) must also be taken into account.

proval by Common Sense of Happiness (=Pleasure and absence of Pain) as intrinsically valuable is overwhelming, and a consideration of Political Theory would provide perhaps even more striking confirmation.

As regards the appeal to our "intuitive judgment after due consideration of the question when fairly placed before it," Mr. Moore remarks that "Professor Sidgwick has failed, in two essential respects, to place the question fairly before either himself or his reader. (1) What he has to show is, as he says himself, *not merely* that 'Happiness must be included as a *part*'¹⁵ of Ultimate Good.' This view, he says, 'ought not to commend itself to be sober judgment of reflective persons.' And why? Because 'these objective relations, when distinguished from the consciousness accompanying and resulting from them, are not ultimately and intrinsically desirable.' Now, this reason, which is offered as showing that to consider Happiness as a mere part of Ultimate Good does not meet the facts of intuition, is, on the contrary, only sufficient to show that it *is* a part of Ultimate Good.¹⁶ For from the fact that no value resides in one part of a whole, considered by itself, we cannot infer that all the value belonging to the whole does reside in the other part, considered by itself." ("Principia Ethica," p. 92.)

On this I have to remark first that a certain amount of awkwardness and obscurity appears to me to be produced by the ellipticalness of the quotations and the way in which they are introduced. I beg a reference to the whole passage¹⁷ from which portions are here quoted. Secondly, I think that Professor Sidgwick in the passage to which Mr. Moore refers is merely trying to show that *cognition of Truth, contemplation of Beauty, etc.*, "when *distinguished from the consciousness accompanying and resulting from them*"¹⁸ are not ultimately and intrinsically desirable," are not in any measure "preferable alter-

¹⁵ Italics mine.

¹⁶ Can it on Mr. Moore's principles do even this? And can we on his principles infer that *any* value resides in "the other part"?

¹⁷ Quoted more fully by Mr. Moore on pp. 85-87.

¹⁸ Italics mine.

natives to Pleasure or Happiness." I cannot perceive that he here arrives at the conclusion that Happiness is the sole ultimate good by subtracting from a whole state of consciousness the "objective relations" under consideration, and concluding that what gives to the whole state the value which it has is solely the emotional element, as Mr. Moore complains that he does. It seems to me that what he does *here* (in the quotation on p. 92) is to isolate for consideration the "objective relations" referred to, and on reflection, reject their claims to be elements which have *intrinsic* value. The claims of purely cognitive and volitional consciousness to be intrinsically valuable are dealt with ("Methods of Ethics" Bk. I, Ch. ix, cp. Bk. II, Ch. xiv, § 5, p. 401) by the same method of distinction and separate consideration, and so is the claim of Happiness—in the latter case this method has been used with special carefulness and rigor (Bk. I, Ch. ix; Bk. II, Chs. ii, iii; Bk. III, Ch. xiv). I am supposing that the Method of Isolation (to use Mr. Moore's phrase) has been sufficiently applied if its object has been *distinguished* from other things and separately *considered*, and that this method does not necessarily require that the isolated thing or element should be even conceived or imagined as existing or occurring in separation. We may distinguish the reflection in a mirror from the object reflected, but do not conceive that it can occur separately, we can distinguish a picture from the canvas on which it is displayed, and may hold the picture or color to be the admirable element in the whole, but we do not think that the picture is actually separable from the canvas. The *object mirrored* is a necessary producing cause of its reflection, the extended surface is a necessary condition (not beautiful in itself) of the presentation of the pleasing picture. We similarly *distinguish* the sides and angles of a triangle, but to try and imagine them actually separated, seems absurd.

Professor Sidgwick certainly, as far as I am aware, does not ask: *If consciousness of pleasure* existed absolutely by itself, etc.¹⁹ But then no more does he ask: If the *objective relations*

¹⁹ Cp. "The Methods of Ethics" (a) p. 133, and (b) 135-136: (a) "It is possible that Green may mean that pleasure cannot be thought to exist apart from conditions which are not feelings and that it necessarily varies

involved in Cognition of Truth, etc., existed absolutely by themselves?—nor does this seem necessary or useful. States of conscious life (including elements of cognition, conation and feeling) and objective relations, are considered as wholes—such *e. g.*, as discovery of truth, satisfied curiosity, eager pursuit, disappointed ambition—and their constituent factors are distinguished and evaluated. Such a procedure appears to satisfy the requirements of the case; and to ask (supposing this possible) whether if, *e. g.*, consciousness of Pleasure *existed absolutely by itself*, it would be intuitively recognized as intrinsically valuable,²⁰ would, it seems to me, taken alone not suffice on Mr. Moore's principles to recommend Hedonism to our acceptance, even though every one agreed as to the intuition,—since, by his Principle of Organic Unity, what is valuable if it exists absolutely by itself, can give no guidance as to the value of any com-

with any variation in its conditions. The statement thus interpreted I do not deny, but it is quite irrelevant to the question whether pleasure can *be estimated* separately from its conditions which are not feelings or whether pleasures received under different conditions can be quantitatively compared. I cannot have the pleasure of witnessing a tragedy or the pleasure of witnessing a farce, without having along with either a complex of innumerable thoughts and images, very diverse in quality in the two cases: but this does not prevent me from deciding confidently whether the tragedy or the farce will afford me most pleasure on the whole."

(b) "So far as my own experience goes, it does not appear to me that the mere transiency of pleasures is a serious source of discontent, so long as one has a fair prospect of having as valuable pleasures in the future as in the past—or even so long as the life before one has any substantial amount of pleasure to offer. But I do not doubt that an important element of happiness, for all or most men, is derived from the consciousness of possessing "relatively permanent" sources of pleasure—whether external, as wealth, social position, family, friends; or internal, as knowledge, culture, strong and lively interest in the well-being of fairly prosperous persons or institutions. This, however, does not in my opinion constitute an objection to Hedonism: it rather seems obvious from the Hedonistic point of view, that "as soon as intelligence discovers that there are fixed objects, permanent sources of pleasure, and large groups of enduring interests, which yield a variety of recurring enjoyments, the rational will, preferring the greater to the less, will unfailingly devote its energies to the pursuit of these."

²⁰ It is Pleasure itself that *is* (not that *means* of course) the value of some valuable whole (compare Truth, Beauty).

plex whole of which it may form a part, so that, even if I knew a whole (ABC)

made up of elements	{	A, having in itself prior to the combination, value a.	
		B, " " " " " " " " b.	
		C, " " " " " " " " c.	

to have value (abc), I could not conclude that *in* (ABC), A has value a, etc.

And since Happiness as we know or can imagine it, only occurs as a factor in complex states, the difficulty arises, on any principles, that something regarded as "existing absolutely by itself" seems difficult to compare with something which is regarded as bound up with other elements of a complex unity. But indeed to talk of Pleasure as existing absolutely by itself, seems as absurd as it would be to talk *e. g.*, of *Trueness* as existing absolutely by itself, in abstraction from facts or statements which *are* true, or *Goodness* as existing apart from things which are good.

In this "intuitionistic" Hedonism (the phrase is Mr. Moore's) there is, I think, no failure to apply a reasonable Method of Isolation to the parts of Wholes-of-Consciousness. Mr. Moore's other requirement as to method here, is regard for his Principle of Organic Unity. This, he holds has not been duly recognized. This Principle is that: The value of a whole [of value] bears no regular proportion to the sum of values of its parts. It does not, however, follow from this that the value of a whole *may* not in some cases be equal to the sum of values of its parts, and Mr. Moore cannot use his Principle here against Professor Sidgwick's conclusion unless he can show, or determine our intellects to allow (and I submit that he has not done this), that *in the case under consideration* the value of the wholes concerned cannot be measured by the pleasure-pain value of their feeling-element. What the Principle of Organic Unity²¹ requires is only that we shall not assume *prior to investigation*, *in any case*, that the value of a whole may be ascer-

²¹ This principle is of more positive application when we are considering,—not essentially complex wholes *qua* good or beautiful—but wholes subject to so-called Physical Division (or Partition) or Metaphysical

tained by summing the values of the parts. It will hardly be disputed that in the case of some "wholes" the value of the whole is equal to the sum of values of the parts, while in the case of other wholes this is not so.

It seems to me that in the particular case of Pleasure-Pain value, if a certain quantity of *e. g.*, pleasure (=pleasant-consciousness) is estimated as having in itself a certain intrinsic value, then since it is allowed that pleasures (and pains) do not vary in quality, if the quantity of pleasure is regarded as in combination with other elements, its intrinsic value when so added must be precisely what it was when taken alone (unless, of course, the *quantity* is supposed to be altered by the entering into combination.) Whether any whole has or has not a value differing from the sum of the values of its parts, would I suppose on Mr. Moore's principles of method only be shown by a careful intuitive evaluation (1) of the parts, and (2) of the whole. As already indicated, however, there seems to be a grave difficulty about this.

Professor Sidgwick apparently holds that desirable conscious life is a complex concrete whole, careful consideration of which shows that its intrinsic value depends upon, or rather is constituted by, the value of the feeling-element of consciousness. This feeling-element may be distinguished and specially considered, but can only occur as part of a complex whole and conditioned by the possibilities and limitations of human existence. According to him, "the good life must be essentially life" ("Lec-

Division; *e. g.*, a Tree as divisible into root, trunk, branches, etc., an Orange as having color, form, taste, etc.

There are two sorts of abstraction, one (necessary for all thought) which abstracts from some of the attributes of things thought of as having denotation or extension, the other which abstracts from denotation altogether, taking concepts (Locke's *abstract ideas*) solely in connotation. In the latter case it is only with the content of the idea, or the definition of the name applying to it, that we can concern ourselves. The Abstract idea "Humanity," *e. g.*, can be analyzed into its constituents, or the word "Humanity" can have a definition, or synonym or translation given of it,—but that is all—all our affirmations here are verbal, or reduce to *A* is *A*. Where, however, the denotative or applicational aspect is taken into account, we are dealing with what is not only *abstract* in the first sense mentioned, but also "concrete", because applying to subjects of attributes. In this case *general* is perhaps a better name than *abstract*.

tures on Green's Ethics," p.119). And again, he says that "all depends on the *quality of life*." It is human life as it ought to be that the human moralist (hedonist or other) is concerned with.

One further argument Mr. Moore marshals at this point. He says that the appeal to Common Sense can only be plausible if it is made in favor of pleasure as a *means*, that there may be a rough proportion between the commendation of a thing by Common Sense and its conduciveness to Happiness, but that Common Sense would deny that the most pleasant (or happy) states are always intrinsically best.

In answer to this I would observe first that Common Sense is certainly (more or less confusedly) aware of *value on the whole*, as well as of *immediate* value. And, indeed, in Common Sense Morality we have, incontestably a most convincing though unconscious witness of the value which Common Sense sets on *means* to Happiness. Secondly, Mr. Moore in putting the case here, instead of confining the inquiry to the question whether Common Sense, as far as it does clearly distinguish, holds the simply most pleasant (or happy) consciousness to be intrinsically the best, the most desirable in itself, confuses the issue by appealing to grotesque imaginations of concrete cases where the causes and concomitants of pleasant feeling are supposed such as to arouse strong condemnation of the whole state. His instances depend for their repulsiveness not upon immediate pleasantness of feeling, but upon the relations of this to other things, especially relations of co-existence, and effect—the estimation of pleasure in itself has got very much tangled up with its estimation on the whole. If it were allowed that pain, *simply in itself* is bad, whatever its causes, accompaniments, and effects,—and pleasant feeling, *simply in itself* good, whatever its causes, accompaniments and effects, it would not follow that Pain is in all cases bad *on the whole*, or Pleasure in all cases good *on the whole*.

Plain Common Sense, though perhaps in general and in the long run broadly right, is seldom exactly so—and may not be very much adapted to distinguish quite clearly and consistently between means and end, and between what is intrinsically good, and what is good on the whole. It can perhaps *not*

“ . . . distinguish and divide
A hair 'twixt north and north-west side.”

But surely there is little doubt that it does set very high value on Happiness as End—the commonest currency of good wishes is “happy returns,” “happy New Year,” “long life and happiness;” and the absence of Happiness, and still more the presence of Pain, are in the view of Common Sense intrinsically objects of reasonable aversion. If the question is fairly before Common Sense whether a happy hour is not good *quâ* happy, and the happier the better as far as immediate or intrinsic value is concerned, does it, or would it, give any other answer than *yes*? That a given concrete state may be pleasant and yet not *good on the whole*, is no proof that pleasant Consciousness (not *uncaused but however caused and connected*) is *in itself* not good, even to crude Common Sense, even on Mr. Moore’s own showing. Similarly a given concrete state may be painful and yet not bad *on the whole*, though *quâ* painful, it is *intrinsically* bad, whatever its accompaniments and casual connections—anything is what it is, and is not its causes or effects. And when men are driven to despair, is it not want of Happiness—absence of pleasure and presence of pain—that drives them to it? One person may be poor and sick and mean and alone in the world without being unhappy, and in such a case his life is valuable to him; another may seem to have everything the world can give and yet be so wretched that life is an intolerable burden. Is it not *misery*, pain without pleasure, however caused, that is felt in itself to be so evil as to be unbearable?

If we could steadily enough abstract and distinguish, we should I think, allow that everywhere and at all times joy, happy feeling, pleasant Consciousness, is *in itself pure good*, is, *in itself*, desirable, worth having, however trivial the cause. A child’s pleasure *e. g.*, in a sweetmeat or a new toy is *in itself* good, and good to see. Pleasure is, in fact, just Goodness of Feeling, as Truth is Goodness of Thinking and Virtue is Goodness of Conduct. Pleasure is also in itself as purely psychical, as absolutely mental, as thought—if we could realize and remember this, it would save pleasant-feeling, awareness-of-pleasure, from much of the obloquy with which it is sometimes attempted

to load it. In as far as there is a Common Sense disinclination to recognize Happiness (=sum of Pleasures *minus Pain*) as The Good, this may be partly explained by the considerations that in ordinary usage Pleasure suggests too prominently the coarser and commoner kinds of pleasures—(here it is the *cause* of the Pleasure which is in fault)—or pleasures which involve as concomitant or consequent either a greater amount of pain or the loss of more important pleasures. And Common Sense often fails to distinguish between the Egoistic and the Utilitarian end, or one's own Happiness and the Happiness of others. ("Methods of Ethics, Bk. III, Ch. xiv, § 5). Again, many important pleasures can only be felt on condition of experiencing desires for other things than pleasure.

We ought to take into consideration, too, the intellectual and volitional equipment involved in seeking even one's own Happiness *on the whole* (=both as End in itself, and as cause or means, and result), the self-control required and the wide and accurate knowledge (1) of the character of those causes which are productive of human Happiness—as *e. g.*, health, wealth, affection, things we care greatly about, or take great interest in, (2) of the means by which those "causes" may be produced. Being as we are, we not only cannot have Pleasure without Consciousness, we cannot have much of it without caring for a great many things other than Happiness. For a creature like man, with a spiritual and social nature, with intellect looking before and after, feeling himself part of a larger whole, caring for others, and—whether he will or not—for truth and beauty and virtue, the causes of Happiness, or Pleasure and absence of Pain (still more of the greatest Happiness of the greatest number), must be many and various, and must include much more than the satisfaction of physical needs, much more, for any individual, than merely "private" or selfish satisfaction. To know of any pain or wrong anywhere is distressing to a rational and sensitive creature. The Universalistic Hedonist is called upon to live the most strenuous and unselfish life—to fulfil all recognized duties, to practice unremittingly the traditional virtues, to love his neighbor as himself. Does not Common Sense approve of a man (at least roughly) in proportion as he conduces to the

Happiness of others? And is not a primary condition of General Happiness, General Virtue (as we commonly conceive Virtue)? And does Common Sense on reflection think that any state of consciousness is in itself worth having if painful or destitute of pleasantness? Or that any state is in itself valueless *quâ* pleasant? And if (as Mr. Moore allows) Pleasure has *some* intrinsic worth, an immense quantity of Pleasure must have a good deal of worth.

The Hedonist Moralist (like any other) in judging any concrete state or action to be actually good, judges it not only by its intrinsic worth, its immediate value as distinguished from antecedents, concomitants and effects, but also with reference to its value *on the whole*, to what it involves of cost and consequences, the past price that may have had to be paid for it in good and means to good, or the future consequences that it may involve in evil and loss of good, or its felicific connections as cause or result. And Common Sense, with a sane and wholesome practical instinct, does the same though in a rougher fashion; but Common Sense is not a psychological expert, and it is perhaps only with an effort that it can consciously estimate the *immediate intrinsic* value of a state or act without being warped by reference to its value on the whole.

(4) The last stage in Mr. Moore's criticism in Ch. III is a consideration of the two forms of Hedonism (1) Egoistic and (2) Utilitarian Hedonism. (1) Is the doctrine that what it is ultimately reasonable for the sensitive and rational agent to seek from a merely personal point of view is his own Happiness, (2) that what it is reasonable for the sensitive and rational agent to seek from a universal point of view is the Happiness of the whole of which he is a part—the greatest Happiness of the greatest number. Egoism (whether Hedonistic or other) Mr. Moore asserts to be self-contradictory, because “when I declare a thing to be my own good,²² I must be declaring it to be *good absolutely* or else not good at all” (p. xvii). “When,” he says (“Principia Ethica,” p. 99), “I talk of a thing as ‘my own good,’ all that I can mean is that something which

²² It may be questioned whether Egotistic *Hedonism* was, as Mr. Moore affirms, “at the bottom of Hobbes's Ethics.”

will be exclusively mine, as my own pleasure is mine (whatever be the various senses of this relation denoted by 'possession'), is also *good absolutely*; or rather that my possession of it is *good absolutely*. The *good* of it can in no possible sense be 'private' or belong to me; any more than a thing can *exist* privately or *for* one person only. The only reason I can have for aiming at 'my own good' is that it is *good absolutely* [absolutely=intrinsically, in itself] that what I so call should belong to me—*good absolutely* that I should *have* something, which, if I have it, others cannot have [?]. But if it is *good absolutely* that I should have it, then everyone else has, *from the universal point of view*, as *much* reason for aiming at *my* having it, as *I have myself*.²³ If therefore, it is true of *any* single man's 'interest' or 'happiness' that [from the universal point of view]²⁴ it ought to be his *sole* ultimate end, this can only mean that *that* man's 'interest' or 'happiness' is *the sole good*, the Universal Good, and the only thing that anybody ought to aim at. What Egoism holds, therefore, is that each man's happiness is the sole good—that a number of different things are *each* of them the only good thing there is—an absolute contradiction!"

In trying to answer Mr. Moore here the first point to notice is that *if* Pleasure is allowed to be something that must be felt, his criticism of Egoistic Hedonism is a criticism from the outside. It is an objection that excludes Pleasure from even having a try for the position of the Good, that arbitrarily rules out Pleasant Feeling from the list of claimants because it does not conform to conditions applicable only to quite different things. Granting that Pleasure is (or may be) a good (as Mr. Moore himself allows) it is clear that if Pleasure exists only as felt, and only for the person who feels it, it must, if it exist at all, be a good *for* or *of* or *to*, that person—its existence must depend on his—it is not like a thunderstorm, or a straight line, which may conceivably exist (as Beauty may) without being an object of consciousness.

Of course if Pleasure can exist without being felt, then there

²³ Italics mine.

²⁴ Mr. Moore's *data* require this addition, but it seems to vitiate his argument.

is no more sense in saying that it is good *for* me or you, than in saying that a straight line is straight for me or for you. But I do not know what psychologist would agree to this. If we accept Happiness or Pleasure as what is *intrinsically* good or desirable, it seems evident that this good cannot exist or be imagined or conceived except as the Happiness of some conscious being or beings—in order that there should be Happiness or Pleasure at all, it must be the Happiness or Pleasure *of* A or B ²⁵ and if Happiness or Pleasure is good, then the Happiness of A or B is, in an intelligible and indeed necessary sense, the good *of* A or B. That it is *absolutely* good means, I suppose, no more than that it is really good in itself, and if it is not this, it cannot be good at all (except as means) and therefore not the Good of anybody. And of course unless Happiness or Pleasure is desirable to the conscious subject of it, it is not good at all: if it is good to him, it is good absolutely, good intrinsically and in itself and rightly judged to be to him desirable or what he *ought to desire*. Similar considerations may be applied to Mr. Moore's "great goods" of Contemplation of Beauty and Personal Affection.

If Happiness is intrinsically good, and the sole good, a man alone in the world, a being with only himself to consider, can have no other end or good than his own Happiness. But when there are others connected with him as members of the same universe, from the point of view of a reasonable knowing creature, of a being rational and sensitive and valuing his own Happiness as *in itself and intrinsically* good, good as *Happiness*, and not simply because it is *his own* (although it must be somebody's) he has to take into account the Happiness (and Misery) of all the other members of his world—the good of each is absolutely and intrinsically good, and therefore reasonably to be promoted by every reasonable creature²⁶—his own Happiness and

²⁵ The "kleine Unbequemlichkeit" caused by the fact that if it exists at all, it must exist as the Happiness of some given individual, is not peculiar to Hedonism, but is shared by all ethical systems that consider "good" to be a good of consciousness. And the difficulties attaching to the differentiation of Being, to the relation of Whole and Part, are also not peculiar to Hedonism.

²⁶ "As *rational beings* we are manifestly bound to aim at good generally,

the Happiness of every other individual is a part of Universal Good, and the Happiness of all together is the whole of that good. Is there any more difficulty here than there is about any other Good of consciousness? It surely matters to me as a conscious being whether it is I or someone else who contemplates Beauty, or feels affection, or experiences Happiness. If such goods as Happiness, Affection, etc., are to exist, *some one* must experience them, and it is only in my own case that I can know directly or immediately of their experience or nature. If there are a plurality of conscious beings in the world, it must be A or B who has experience in a given case. By the very conditions and limitations of conscious life as known to us, such goods must have a special individualized existence, but they cannot be "goods" to A or B unless they are good. For the Hedonist, Happiness is truly good in itself and every quantum of Happiness a part of Universal Good; but all the same, each portion of this is an absolutely inalienable asset of some individual who is as absolutely unable to transfer it as he is to transfer his intelligence or sweet temper, his loyalty or good taste. They are "his" like his Happiness in the sense that without him they cannot exist, and that they die with him—though the remembrance of them may live.

To the question "Is general Happiness the right end of action?" the Universalistic Hedonist answers *Yes*; but he would have no reason to say so unless he knew from his own experience, as a matter of intuition, that his own Happiness is to him desirable, and rightly judged to be intrinsically good, an end in itself. Thus Egoistic Hedonism is the presupposition of Universalistic Hedonism—unless *each one's* Happiness concerned him primarily and individually, there would, on hedonistic principles, be no good of the whole to be aimed at.

If it is reasonable for anyone to aim at his own Happiness, because it is good (it is both his good, and also a part of universal good) difficulty about the end can only arise where one portion of universal good comes into conflict with

not merely at this or that part of it; we can only evade the conviction of this obligation by denying that there is any such universal good." Methods of Ethics, Bk. III, Ch. xiii, §3.

some other portion. The conflict when it does occur is very frequently (though by no means always) between the good of the agent himself and of some other; *both* are parts of universal good, we must remember, and universal good is made up of all the particular parts. The perfect good for each, regarded both as an individual and as part of the whole, would be something which, while in itself and intrinsically *best* to him, is also a *means* to what is intrinsically best to all the rest of the world, while what is intrinsically best to them is to him a means to his end (or to part of his end). *Your* Happiness is not, and cannot be, *my* Happiness, but it may be a *cause* of mine. Is it not this which is meant in the poet's dream: "All men find their own in all men's good?" The intrinsic good for one is conceived as a *means* to the intrinsic good for others, the happiness of one is a cause of happiness in others, and pain in one is cause of pain in others. Each one may be aware that the happier he is, the happier he makes other people. (It is not any man's *Happiness* which need deprive any other of Happiness, but his possession of certain means to Happiness [*e. g.*, wealth]. My being happy does not exclude anyone else from being so—but my having a given *cause* of Happiness may exclude him from having it.) Thus Rational Benevolence or Benevolent Reason would rule.

And if the Good—that which we as sensitive creatures who are both individuals and members of a community, rationally desire—is Happiness (excellence of Feeling) both for ourselves and others, considering *our* Good *on the whole*, and *their* Good *on the whole*—that is, Universal Good—and the means to this—there seems plenty of scope for an articulate Theory of Good, in which the whole of Human Nature in its individuality and relatedness, in its complexity as rational, sensitive, and volitional, and all members of the human community, are duly taken account of.

Happiness is not an isolated, closed uncaused, inefficient, unrelated item—as an element of experience, as making life worth having, it is also cause and effect, and on a comprehensive view has to be so considered. Happiness always and everywhere, *in itself*, *quâ* Happiness, is good—but we have to consider it

also as means and result. Even if Personal Affection and Contemplation of Beauty were always "good" in themselves, they must, as "moments" of life (*Conscious life*) be also so considered. But *are* they always good in themselves? Not only may both *Æsthetic Contemplation* and *Personal Affection* have evil and ugly antecedents, accompaniments and effects (just as *Pleasant Consciousness* may), but also in concrete instances they may both have evil and ugly elements, which are essential factors of the case. Nero fiddling while Rome was on fire is not a solitary instance in which, taking a state of *æsthetic enjoyment* as a whole (and it seems to be an essential requirement of Mr. Moore's method that it should be taken—see *e. g.*, "*Principia Ethica*," §55), that state cannot be judged good or beautiful, but on the contrary is very evil, and affection may be foolish, exacting, not "good" even to the person beloved, unjust to others; and even an admirable and devoted affection may be intensely painful—*e. g.*, if its object is suffering or in danger, or becomes unworthy.

Hedonism is not tied down to any hard and fast system of unvarying rules, but allows of such rules as are generally acceptable and accepted being modified or transcended if required, in order that, in any given concrete case, that conduct may be chosen which is most conducive to the end—it thus combines stability of *end* with flexibility of *means* and the most untrammelled liberty of reference—the supremacy of the reasonable individual with some assistance and support from science and the practical wisdom of others. Even the greatest genius is not so unique that he starts entirely fresh—and in any department he may be helped, though he need not be bound, by traditional rules and inherited knowledge.

Should we not on the line already indicated attain to a theoretical "harmony between the maxim of Prudence and the maxim of Rational Benevolence" (see "*Principia Ethica*," p. 102), our end being the greatest Happiness both of the individual agent and of the whole, and would not the practical acceptance of Hedonism (Ideal Hedonism it might be called) of this type, tend to an immense increase in *æsthetic enjoyment* and *personal affection* (which both no doubt have value)?

Mr. Moore says that (1) Egoistic and (2) Universalistic Hedonism are directly contradictory to each other and that (1) is self-contradictory; but the above conception does not, I think, involve a contradiction. It does indeed not seem at present completely realizable, and seems almost indefinitely far from being *completely* realized, still there is no reason why it should not come to be realized much more than it is. It is already realized almost completely in some persons, and to a considerable extent in most—consider *e. g.*, Mr. Moore's very emphatic condemnation of cruelty, which is in thorough accord with Common Sense, and the general approval of a person who feels pleasure at the pleasure of others, and pain at their pain. The extent to which Utilitarianism²⁷ theoretical or practical is actually accepted is also significant in this connection. Of course, in so far as Duty and Self-interest do as a matter of fact diverge, the hedonistic end cannot be altogether attained, and there remains not only a discrepancy of "mere fact" but also, for the individual agent concerned, the practical impossibility of being completely rational, and further it may be, a serious difficulty in knowing which of possible alternatives is *most* rational. All these however some conceivable distribution of sanctions might remove—they are difficulties which depend upon matter of fact, upon the actual condition of affairs, and might, as Professor Sidgwick points out, be amended by "an alteration in facts" ("Principia Ethica," p. 103).

Of Mr. Moore's own view of what the "great positive goods" are—namely Contemplation of what is Beautiful and Personal Affection—it may be asked whether they are not abstract in the same sense in which Happy Conscious States are abstract, and whether they are not open to the objections which he brings on that score against Happiness as an end. They may indeed be "complex wholes" as he observes, but if so Happiness is also a complex whole. It is *conscious life which is pleasant and free from pain*, and involves at least (1) a conscious subject; (2) an object presented to that subject, (3) the feeling which the subject consequently has. Perhaps Mr. Moore would say that Happiness thus conceived is *not* the end of Hedonism. Well,

²⁷ I agree that the name is not a good one.

the name does not matter, but the *Pleasure existing absolutely by itself* which Mr. Moore has tried to force upon "Hedonists" as their end is not only a palpably impossible end, it is also *not* the end which Hedonists would accept and defend.

If Mr. Moore intends to appeal on behalf of his own view to Common Sense, it may be suggested that ordinary Common Sense would hardly pronounce Contemplation of Beauty to be one of the very greatest of (non-hedonistic) goods, a good which is an end in itself. And if the case were put so that Contemplation of Beauty is not understood as necessarily implying Pleasure, would not Common Sense decisively disagree with Mr. Moore? If by Contemplation of Beauty is meant *Contemplation-of-Beauty when pleasurable and not too expensive*, then indeed, Common Sense would probably agree that this is in itself good. Again, if Personal Affection was not at all pleasant intrinsically, as it sometimes is not, and had no "good" effects, as it sometimes has not, would Common Sense approve? Would anyone think it one of the greatest goods? And what if it were accompanied by absence of pleasure, or presence of pain? And if, as Mr. Moore holds, knowledge of *causes* of good is so inadequate and untrustworthy, whilst the "great goods" of Personal Affection and Contemplation of Beauty are interrupted and broken, subject to relapses, waverings, vanishings (as they are), they present a somewhat unsatisfactory end of action. Again, there seems a quantitative difficulty. How much Beauty is it of which the contemplation is good? How great must Personal affection be in order to be good? Further the relation of Beauty to Good wants clearing up, for while Contemplation of Beauty is good, Beauty is said to be *that of which the contemplation is good*—thus the statement that *Contemplation of Beauty is good* means that *Contemplation of that of which the Contemplation is good, is good*. Is this tautology or not? And unless affection means Benevolence interpreted hedonistically, we are also left asking what is to be understood by affection, and I have still a further difficulty as to how "good" in "good persons" is to be understood. The Personal Affection which is a "great good" is explained (p. 224) to be "love of good persons," and this love includes,

as its probably most valuable element, appreciation of actual corporeal beauty (so far, I suppose, affection=admiration). Are we to conclude that the "goodness" of the persons beloved is (extensionally not intensionally) beauty—that it is the *beautiful* thing that is the *good thing*? Material qualities—matter—are according to Mr. Moore (p. 207) "the best we know." I am further not quite clear in the end, whether, when Mr. Moore says that Personal Affection (which is a good of consciousness) is a great good, he means that it is good as an object of contemplation to the disinterested spectator, or that it is good to the person who feels it (cp. "Principia Ethica" p. xxvi, §122), or to the person who is the object of it, or that it is judged by the spectator to be good because of its intrinsic value as an element of the conscious life of the person who feels it. It is announced as a good of consciousness—it must therefore always exist as a good of some conscious being. In short, my difficulty here is: *What* is that Whole of Personal Affection which is such a great good?

Mr. Moore, as we have seen, says that Personal Affection and Contemplation of Beauty are the two great goods—they have, however, in his view to be taken as Whole States. Now, if Mr. Moore (as I understand him to do), gives, as a reason why *Pleasant Consciousness* may not be taken as a good in itself, the fact that it may occur as part of a state in which some of the constituent elements are evil (either intrinsically or as means), then, according to his principles, Personal Affection and Contemplation of Beauty ought not to be taken as goods in themselves, because they may occur (which they certainly may) as parts of states in which there are elements which are evil and ugly. Clearly either (1) Personal Affection and Contemplation of Beauty should be taken as intrinsically and therefore always under all circumstances good in themselves, abstracting from all accompaniments, etc., which though unessential may be actual—so that a state is good *in as far* as it contains Personal Affection or Contemplation of Beauty—*i. e.*, abstractly (in the sense in which *abstract*=*general* and does not exclude denotation); or, (2) taking *the whole states* in which Personal Affection and Contemplation of

Beauty occur, we must say that these whole states (on account of the presence of Personal Affection and Contemplation of Beauty, and irrespective of what their other constituents may be), are always good—*i. e.*, the *concrete states* are good as Wholes. But in (1) we do *not* take actual unabridged concrete cases, whereas this is what Mr. Moore sometimes seems to insist upon as a requirement of method (see “*Principia Ethica*,” § 55). It may be observed that to *do* this—to take actual concrete states as wholes—would apparently make even an extensive definition” of The Good out of the question—it would surely reduce us to that hopelessly unsystematic ethical view which Professor Sidgwick calls Perceptual Intuitionism. In (2) we *do* adopt this procedure; but as Mr. Moore will not allow it to be done in the case of *e. g.*, Pleasant Consciousness, inconsistency of method seems again to be the result.

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LITERATURE AND THE MORAL CODE.

“Vérité en dèçà des Pyrénées, erreur au delà.”—*Pascal*.

Within the past few months one or two English authors have put on the stage plays which have been attacked for the freedom which they allowed themselves in discussing moral problems. This is unusual, for it is generally French writers who arouse criticism on that score. The stir created by these plays in Anglo-Saxon countries makes it appear timely to discuss the respective attitudes of Anglo-Saxon and of Latin races in such matters.

No attempt will be made in the present paper to show that one side is right and the other wrong; nor is it intended to offer a compromise. On the contrary, the purpose of this article is to show that the two standpoints are not reducible to the same terms, to show why they are bound to clash and why there can be no reconciliation. An attempt will be made to make the problem thus presented better understood.